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Abstract
International trade has long been considered a channel of technology transfer. This 
paper draws from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys to provide a sample of 18 
developing and emerging economies to investigate whether global value chains 
(GVCs) are a vehicle for the transfer of technology. It focuses on one specific chan-
nel for technology transfer, namely, the licensing of foreign technology. To control 
for the possible endogeneity of technology licensing, propensity score matching is 
combined with a difference-in-differences approach. The results show a positive 
effect of being involved in two-way trading on the licensing of foreign technology. 
Firms that become two-way traders are significantly more likely to use foreign-
licensed technology than firms starting to export or import. This evidence suggests 
that the complexity associated with the mode of internationalisation determines the 
licensing of foreign technology. GVC participation also appears to foster firms’ per-
formance, reflecting my findings that the acquisition of foreign technology leads to 
significant productivity improvements.
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Recent decades have witnessed a dramatic change in international trade and pro-
duction patterns. Twenty-first-century trade and production are structured around 
so-called global value chains (GVCs) where stages of a single production process 
are dispersed internationally. It is often argued that GVCs have offered a new path 
towards industrial development, since firms from high-technology nations are com-
bining their firm-specific managerial, technical and marketing know-how with the 
low wages in developing nations (Baldwin 2016). However, little is known about the 
implications of GVCs in supporting the international transfer of technology to firms 
in developing countries.
Nowadays, most trade concerns the movement of inputs between and across 
countries. According to the OECD (2015), three-quarters of world trade involves 
intermediate and capital goods. The increasing importance of input trade has 
accompanied a parallel increase in the customisation of products (Antràs and Staiger 
2012). As a result, to minimise the transaction costs involved with the production 
and incorporation of inputs into final goods, the firm leading the supply chain (here-
after ‘the buyer’) may transfer intellectual property rights and know-how to its sup-
pliers.1 As Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2015) states, “When Toyota makes car 
parts in Thailand, they do not rely on local know-how; they bring Toyota technol-
ogy, Toyota management, Toyota logistics and any other bits of know-how needed 
since the Thai-made parts have to fit seamlessly into the company’s production net-
work” (p. 1684).
According to Antràs and Staiger (2012), intermediate input purchases tend to be 
associated with significant lock-in effects for both buyers and sellers. For example, 
differentiated intermediate inputs are frequently customised to meet the needs of 
their intended buyers and hence embody a disproportionate amount of relationship-
specific investments (Nunn 2007), which may be difficult to recoup when trans-
acting with various parties. Moreover, offshoring often involves a costly search 
for suitable foreign suppliers or foreign buyers, making separations expensive and 
thereby providing another source of lock-in. The competitive pressure imposed on 
firms participating in a supply chain is crucial for firms in developing countries.2 
Rigo (2017) argues that the fragmentation of production processes has significantly 
affected manufacturing firms in developing nations, showing that a common set of 
technologies and capabilities correlate with firms’ participation in complex interna-
tional activities.
While global buyers, which to date reside overwhelmingly in developed coun-
tries, take great care to protect their technologies or product innovations, they 
1 There is broad consensus that large international buyers play a key role in global value chains (Gereffi 
1999; Antras 2015).
2 Close to zero defects and delivery on time require sophisticated process design, supply chain manage-
ment software, high-speed telecoms networks and effective transport and logistics services. Each day of 
delay in exporting has a tariff equivalent of 1 percent or more for time-sensitive products (Hummels et al. 
2007). Slow and unpredictable land transport keeps most of Sub-Saharan Africa out of the electronics 
value chain (Christ and Ferrantino 2011).
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may be willing to share their knowledge with their foreign suppliers in developing 
countries to reduce the costs and uncertainty of trading intermediate goods along 
global or regional supply chains.3 This paper tests for this prediction by investi-
gating whether GVCs may incentivise the transfer of foreign technologies to firms 
in developing countries. My findings contribute to the literature in three respects. 
First, I examine the implications of international trade on an empirically unexplored 
channel of technology transfer, namely, foreign licensing.4 Based on a representa-
tive sample of manufacturing firms for 130 developing nations, Rigo (2017) shows 
that those firms using foreign-licensed technology account for 30% of employment 
(on average), similar to the figure for foreign-owned firms. This evidence suggests 
that foreign licensing may be an essential and alternative channel to foreign direct 
investment (FDI) for the transfer of international technologies to developing coun-
tries. Second, I investigate whether the complexity of the firm’s trading status affects 
the licensing of foreign technology to firms in developing countries. The literature 
has shown that the transfer of technology through international trade may depend on 
several factors, but this is the first paper, to the best of the author’s knowledge, that 
distinguishes between simple traders (defined as exporters-only or importers-only) 
and complex traders (two-way traders) in studying the international transfer of tech-
nology. Third, I consider the implications of acquiring a foreign-licensed technology 
on firms’ performance.
The empirical analysis is based on a sample of 3340 manufacturing firms from 
the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys. These surveys are harmonised to construct 
a two-year panel data set for 18 developing and emerging economies covering the 
period 2006-2016.5 To control for the potential endogeneity embedded in the rela-
tionship between international trade and technology adoption, my empirical strat-
egy combines a propensity score matching (PSM) technique with a difference-in-
differences (diff-in-diff) approach. As a first step, I use a PSM technique to match 
each firm participating in a GVC (treatment group) with a synthetic counterfactual 
(control group). This matching process pairs up each firm that will start a complex 
trading activity in the future (i.e. firms becoming two-way traders) with a domestic 
plant or a simple trader having very similar observable characteristics. I then calcu-
late the average difference in the probability of using foreign-licensed technology 
between firms becoming involved in complex trading activities and their matched 
3 As documented by World Bank (2020) for the apparel, textile and information and communication 
technology industries in Ethiopia and Vietnam, buyers are more willing to share knowledge and know-
how with their suppliers in GVC relationships.
4 According to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), licensed technology must consti-
tute a partnership between an intellectual property owner and a licensee who is authorised to use such 
rights under certain conditions. The licensee is manufacturing a product for which it has been granted 
production rights under specific conditions, while the licensor retains ownership of the associated intel-
lectual property. In some cases, the licensor supplies the necessary technical data, prototypes and/or 
machine tools to the licensee. Licensing agreements determine the form and scope of compensation to 
the intellectual property owner, which usually takes the form of a flat licensing fee or a running royalty 
payment derived from a share of the licensee’s revenue.
5 Studying a large set of developing and emerging economies, covering all continents of the world, pro-
vides confidence in the generalisability of my findings.
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control firms. This strategy allows controlling for observable time-variant and unob-
servable time-invariant firm characteristics.6
The results show a positive effect of being involved in complex trading activity 
on the licensing of foreign technology. Firms becoming two-way traders are signifi-
cantly more likely to use foreign-licensed technology than firms starting to export 
or import. This evidence suggests that the complexity associated with the mode of 
internationalisation determines the licensing of foreign technology. The second part 
of my empirical analysis investigates the impact of acquiring foreign-licensed tech-
nology on firm-level productivity. Using once again a PSM diff-in-diff approach, I 
find that foreign licensing leads to large increases in total factor productivity (TFP) 
and labour productivity. The improvement is on the order of 88% for TFP and 50% 
for labour productivity. These findings suggest that GVC participation through 
access to foreign technologies fosters firms’ performance.
The empirical literature has long considered international trade a channel of tech-
nology transfer. Exposure to international markets may bring several advantages 
(better quality inputs and higher revenues), which may lead to productivity gains 
(Amiti and Konings 2007; Topalova and Khandelwal 2011; Halpern et al. 2015) and 
motivate firms to invest further in upgrading their technology (Bustos 2011; Lileeva 
and Trefler 2010). Moreover, firms that export are expected to absorb new knowl-
edge from foreign markets and buyers. However, learning by exporting is far from 
guaranteed and is conditional on several factors. For instance, such learning tends 
to occur more when firms are exporting to advanced economies (De Loecker 2007), 
when they are exporting multiple products or to multiple destinations (Masso and 
Vahter 2015), or when firms are involved in knowledge-intensive activities (Benko-
vskis et al. 2020). Coherently with this literature, I show that GVC participation may 
unlock the international transfer of knowledge to a further degree.
This paper also relates to the recent empirical literature studying the impact of 
GVCs on economic development. Recent macro evidence points to the beneficial 
role of GVCs in developing nations’ industrial development (Kummritz 2016; Con-
stantinescu et al. 2019; Altomonte et al. 2018). More closely related to my paper, 
Piermartini and Rubinova (2014) provide evidence that GVCs are a much stronger 
facilitator of knowledge spillovers than final goods trade. Coherently, this paper 
reveals that GVC participation can enhance developing countries’ learning possibili-
ties through the introduction of new foreign technologies. A related body of empiri-
cal literature using firm-level data shows that GVC participation fosters firms’ per-
formance in developing countries (Gereffi 1999; Pietrobelli and Saliola 2008; Atkin 
et al. 2017; Del Prete et al. 2017; Benkovskis et al. 2020). My paper extends this 
literature, illustrating how through foreign licensing, GVC participation generates 
significant productivity gains in manufacturing firms in developing and emerging 
economies.
6 One potential concern is that the PSM diff-in-diff procedure is not able to control for time-variant 
unobservable factors that may affect simultaneously the decision to join a GVC and to use foreign-
licensed technology. My empirical strategy thus relies on the assumption that the unobserved differences 
between treated and untreated firms are time-invariant.
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Finally, FDI represents another major channel of international technology trans-
fer (see Javorcik (2013) for a review of the literature). Studies indicate that multi-
national enterprises are responsible for the majority of technology advancements, 
which they can bring to their host countries (Arnold and Javorcik 2009; Jiang et al. 
2018), especially through supply chain linkages. Newman et  al. (2015) show that 
multinational enterprises transfer their technology and methods to their operations 
in destination markets through supply chain activities. Alfaro-Urena et  al. (2019) 
find that firms in Costa Rica experienced strong and persistent improvements in per-
formance after starting to supply multinationals. My paper complements this litera-
ture, suggesting that through foreign licensing multinational enterprises might trans-
fer international technology to their suppliers located in developing countries.
The paper is structured as follows: Sect. 2 presents the data and discusses meas-
urement issues, Sect. 3 lays out the empirical strategy and presents the main findings 
and Sect. 4 summarises the conclusions.
2  Data
This paper is based on a sample of 3340 manufacturing firms7 from the World 
Bank’s Enterprise Surveys. These surveys are harmonised to construct a two-year 
panel data set for 18 developing and emerging economies covering the period 2006-
2016. Firms in different countries are evaluated in different time periods, with an 
average time span between the two surveys of 4 years.8
2.1  Main variables of interest
The aim of my analysis is to identify whether foreign technology is transferred to 
firms participating in GVCs. This exercise entails two main challenges: measur-
ing technology transfer and identifying firms participating in international supply 
chains.
First, the transfer of technology is measured by whether the firm uses foreign-
licensed technology. The World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys define a technology 
license as the intellectual property right necessary to create and market a product 
that complies with a technical standard or specification.9 In my analysis, foreign 
licensing implies that a buyer licenses its technology to a foreign supplier in sup-
port of a consistent production process or specialised equipment to manufacture a 
product. For instance, a global manufacturer of photovoltaic panels may license the 
process for depositing silicon on its solar panels to a firm in a developing country.
7 Formal (registered) companies with 5 or more employees are targeted for interview. Firms with 100% 
government/state ownership are not eligible for interview.
8 See Table 9 in the “Appendix” for the list of surveys.
9 The question in the survey is as follows: “Does this establishment at present use technology licensed 
from a foreign-owned company, excluding office software?”
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Since the survey provides no information about either the duration or type of 
licensing agreement, I am not able to quantify the strength of the transfer of technol-
ogy. Licensing agreements may offer rights to produce for a given period of time 
and may involve performance requirements, such as non-disclosure mandates, non-
compete clauses for personnel and grant-back provisions on adaptive innovations 
(Maskus 2004), which may reduce the possibility of technology transfers. However, 
the fact that firms acquiring foreign-licensed technology enjoy significant productiv-
ity gains (as shown in Sect. 3.4) downplays this concern. Another potential short-
coming is the lack of information on the technology owner (i.e. the firm licensing 
the foreign technology). However, it seems reasonable to assume that the majority of 
licensing owners reside in advanced economies and possess superior technologies.
Second, few empirical studies distinguish between GVC firms and non-GVC 
firms. Nadvi (2008) and Del Prete et  al. (2017) identify GVC firms as traders 
(exporter-only, importer-only or two-way traders) with a quality certification. This 
definition is based on the idea that global standards reduce transaction costs across 
firms by ensuring the codifiability of information. However, the definition is overly 
general because it includes any type of trading firms, even those involved in tradi-
tional trade activities. Instead, my condition sine qua non to participate in GVCs is 
to be a two-way trader (i.e. exporting and importing at the same time) because this is 
the only measurable category that includes all firms with internationally fragmented 
production processes.10 In particular, my definition sets apart a firm that imports 
and exports at the same time from a firm that is either importing or exporting. I 
exclude the latter groups of firms because importing and exporting at the same time 
has economic implications that are qualitatively distinct from being engaged in only 
one activity (Damijan et al. 2013; Rigo 2017; Bernard et al. 2018).11 My definition 
is in line with Benkovskis et  al. (2020) that, using detailed customs data for Lat-
via and Estonia, look at different types of participation in GVCs, including firms 
importing and exporting the same product. This definition is also consistent with 
the recent macro literature that has emphasised that a GVC is defined as involving 
production sharing between two or more countries (i.e. when intermediate goods are 
both imported and exported) (Los et al. 2016; Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez 2015; 
Koopman et al. 2014).12
As a robustness check, I benchmark my measure of GVC participation (as the 
share of two-way traders in total employment) with a measure of GVC participa-
tion widely used in the literature (as the share of foreign value added in exports). 
The latter GVC measure is calculated at the country-industry level using the OECD 
10 The literature is converging on using two-way trading as the firm-level measure of GVC participation, 
as documented in World Bank (2020).
11 This category may also include firms operating in special economic zones involved in processing 
trade. However, those firms exporting all their sales and importing all their intermediate inputs account 
for only 1 percent of my sample and are excluded from the empirical analysis.
12 A potential limitation of my definition is that some two-way traders may be only weakly participating 
in international supply chains, such as those firms importing raw materials and exporting final products. 
Unfortunately, I am not able to disentangle different types of GVC participation because the data do not 
include the product classification of imports/exports.
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inter-country input-output (ICIO) tables.13 The analysis considers only the develop-
ing economies available in the OECD ICIO data. The correlation between these two 
measures is at 35% and significant at the 1% level. Notably, the correlations between 
the share of exporters-only or importers-only in total employment and the foreign 
value added in exports are weaker and not significantly different from zero (at the 
10% level).14
Finally, I provide some stylised facts on the link between GVC participation and 
foreign technology licensing. Table 1 breaks down firms according to their trade ori-
entation and use of foreign-licensed technology. The table highlights the presence of 
a hierarchy in the adoption of foreign-licensed technology, with trading firms char-
acterised by higher shares than non-traders. Among trading firms, those active in 
multiple modes of internationalisation (i.e. two-way traders) are more likely to use 
foreign technology. Rigo (2017) provides similar evidence for a wide set of devel-
oping and emerging economies, showing that two-way traders are the most likely 
group of firms to possess foreign-licensed technologies. This finding reflects either 
the positive selection of firms into two-way trading or the presence of a learning 
mechanism (as highlighted by Alcacer and Oxley (2014) and Benkovskis et  al. 
(2020)). Table  2 illustrates that selection matters, with two-way traders being the 
largest firms in these economies. On average, two-way traders have twice and four 
times the number of employees compared to exporters-only and importers-only, 
respectively. To control for the fact that size may determine both participation in 
GVCs and foreign licensing, my empirical strategy compares firms conditional on 
their initial number of employees and on the growth in employees over the past three 
years.
2.2  Firm‑level variables
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the firm-level variables used in the empiri-
cal analysis.15 Exporters-only and importers-only account for 5 and 34% of the sam-
ple, respectively. Exporters are defined as those firms directly exporting part of their 
sales. Instead, firms indirectly exporting via third parties are considered as non-trad-
ers. Importers are those firms purchasing part of their material inputs or supplies 
from a foreign country. My measure of GVC participation, importing and exporting 
at the same time, consequently sets out those firms importing final goods. Firms 
active in two-way trading represent 21% of the sample. As a result, non-traders make 
up the remaining 40% of firms. Moreover, foreign-owned firms account for 11% of 
the sample, where foreign-owned firms are defined as firms that are controlled more 
than 10% by a foreign individual, company or organisation.
13 See this link for further information on the OECD ICIO tables: https ://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/inter 
-count ry-input -outpu t-table s.htm.
14 To put this finding in perspective, standard measures of firm performance, such as the number of 
employees, total sales or total costs of goods sold, correlate between 10 and 20% with one another (at the 
country-industry level of aggregation).
15 The following shares are based on the pooled sample of firms.
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As a measure of firm-level productivity, I use labour productivity, as value added 
per worker, and total factor productivity (TFP), calculated following the methodol-
ogy developed by Wooldridge (2009).16 The employment variable is defined as the 
number of permanent full-time workers, while employment growth rate is derived 
over the past three years.17 Other firm-level variables used in the empirical analy-
sis include the age of the firm in years, a measure of skill intensity as the share of 
non-production workers over total workers, a measure of capital intensity as total 
assets (net book value of machinery, equipment, land and buildings) per worker and 
a measure of average wage as labour costs (including wages, salaries, bonuses and 
social security payments) per worker.
3  Empirical strategy and results
This section sheds light on whether GVC participation facilitates the transfer of 
foreign technologies to firms in developing countries. First, I identify the variables 
used in matching control and treated firms for implementing the PSM technique. 
Second, I estimate the effect of becoming a two-way trader on the probability of 
using foreign-licensed technology and I present the main findings. Third, to further 
increase confidence in my results, I compare firms active in multiple modes of inter-
nalisation and simple traders. Finally, I investigate the relationship between acquir-
ing a foreign-licensed technology and firm-level productivity.
3.1  Matching strategy
To implement the PSM, I need to model the probability of joining a GVC. I do so by 
estimating a probit model of a firm becoming a two-way trader with firm character-
istics as explanatory variables, all of which are included in the initial year and thus 
refer to the pre-treatment period.
This analysis is implemented by estimating the following specification:
(1)Switchijc = 0 + 1Xijc + j + c + ijc
16 The estimation assumes a Cobb-Douglas production function in which value added is the output vari-
able. I use the number of full-time employees as a proxy for labour costs, while tangible capital is the net 
book value of fixed assets (machinery, equipment, land and buildings), and cost of materials is the total 
annual cost of raw materials and intermediate goods used in production. The estimation is performed at 
the country level, as the number of observations is not enough to perform separate country-industry esti-
mations and no industry-specific deflator is available. I also derived firm-level TFP estimates using the 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) procedure. Since the results are quantitatively and qualitatively equivalent, 
I follow previous studies (CompNet 2014; Borin and Mancini 2016; Del Prete et al. 2017) and use Wool-
dridge (2009) TFP estimates as my main measure of productivity. The pairwise correlations among these 
three productivity measures are high, close to 90%.
17 It is possible to retrieve this variable thanks to a question in the questionnaire asking the firm to report 
the total number of permanent full-time workers three years earlier.
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where i denotes the firm, j the industry and c the country. Switchijc is a dummy vari-
able indicating firms, the ‘switchers’, becoming two-way traders from one year to 
another.18 Not considered in the analysis are two categories of firms: the ‘quitters’, 
which are firms that cease to be engaged in two-way trading, and firms that are 
always two-way traders in both years.19 Similarly to previous studies, Xijc includes 
Table 1  Break-down of firms 




Domestic Importer Exporter Two-
way 
trader
Yes 8 16 21 25
No 92 84 79 75
Table 2  Break-down of firms by trading status and size, per cent
Size Domestic Importer Exporter Two-way 
trader
Total
Small (< 50 employees) 78 65 42 26 61
Medium (50 ≤ < 250) 18 27 32 37 26
Large ( ≥ 250) 4 8 26 37 13
Table 3  Summary statistics
Variable No. of obs. Mean SD Min Max
Employment (log) 6659 3.65 1.53 0 9.80
Δ Employment 6092 0.09 0.44 − 2.99 5.21
Foreign (dummy) 6619 0.11 0.31 0 1
Two-way trader (dummy) 6678 0.21 0.41 0 1
Importer (dummy) 6678 0.34 0.47 0 1
Exporter (dummy) 6678 0.05 0.22 0 1
Skill intensity (share) 6607 0.26 0.20 0 1
Age 6594 24.07 18.68 0 157
Average wage (log) 5746 12.80 3.04 2.80 22.47
Labour productivity (log) 5281 14.24 3.13 5.12 26.75
TFP (log) 3737 12.33 2.52 3.56 24.59
Capital intensity (log) 3957 13.50 3.45 0.25 33.48
18 When working with yearly- or monthly-level customs data, re-entry into two-way trading might be a 
concern. Nevertheless, given the longer time frame (with an average of 4 years) used in my analysis, this 
issue should play a minor role. In my analysis, I am looking at an organisational change at the firm level, 
rather than some form of seasonality or temporary idiosyncratic shock.
19 Further information on the number of switchers by country and industry is provided in the “Appen-
dix”. Table  10 displays the proportion of switchers in the total number of firms by country. Table  11 
complements this overview by showing the number of switchers by industry.
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the following firm-level measures: labour productivity (log),20 skill intensity (share), 
employment growth, age, a dummy for exporters-only, a dummy for importers-only 
and a dummy for foreign-owned firms.21 In addition, the specification uses industry 
and country fixed effects. The latter allow for the isolation of potential differences 
across countries in GVC participation and industrial development. Meanwhile, 
industry fixed effects account for differences across industries such as the level of 
competition, technology use, market demand and trade intensity. The results are 
based on a probit model, being the dependent variable a binary outcome.22 All esti-
mation results are based on robust standard errors.
Table 4 presents the coefficients of my model.23 While most firm-level variables 
are not significant, the probability of becoming a two-way trader is mainly deter-
mined by size and by being an exporter or an importer in the pre-treatment year. 
The predicted probability of joining a GVC forms the basis of the matching pro-
cedure. Matching is performed at the initial period, before receiving the treatment, 
and firms are also matched within the same country and the same industry. This 
approach eliminates the possibility that a difference in foreign-technology adoption 
across countries and industries influences the estimated effects. Moreover, choos-
ing the minimum number of matches required leads to a trade-off between bias 
(higher number higher bias) and variance (higher number lower variance) (Caliendo 
and Kopeinig 2008). I decided to minimise the bias in estimating the effect of GVC 
participation by requiring at least one match in the baseline results. The matching 
framework, as defined, creates a ‘third group’ of firms, consisting of each treated 
firm’s matched counterfactual used as control group in the diff-in-diff analysis.
A crucial assumption in using the PSM technique is that treated and matched 
firms must have the same distribution of observable characteristics, conditional on 
a given propensity score. I test this assumption by implementing the following pro-
cedure. First, I divide treated and untreated firms into 8 groups based on their pro-
pensity scores. Second, within each group, I test whether the mean of each variable 
is significantly different between treated and untreated firms.24 I find no statistically 
significant differences between treated and untreated firms for any matching vari-
able. Unfortunately, with two-period data, I am not able to test for the parallel trends 
assumption, requiring that the difference between treated and untreated firms should 
be constant in the pre-treatment period. However, given that my analysis excludes 
firms possessing a foreign-licensed technology in the pre-treatment period ( t − 1 ), 
20 Labour productivity, as value added per worker, is my preferred measure for productivity because TFP 
is not available for the whole sample. Nevertheless, using TFP as a productivity measure does not affect 
the estimates in Table 4.
21 Capital intensity and average wage are not included in the set of matching variables because they are 
highly collinear with labour productivity.
22 The results are quantitatively and qualitatively equivalent when using a logit model. Regression tables 
are available upon request.
23 The average marginal effects of the discrete differences in probability are reported. For instance, in 
Table  4, the coefficient of Exporter indicates the difference in probability between exporters-only and 
non-traders.
24 This procedure is based on Becker and Ichino (2002) and excludes the observations outside the com-
mon support.
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the parallel trends assumption would be violated only if treated or untreated firms 
possessed a foreign technology in t − 2 (or in previous years) that they eventually 
‘lost’ in t − 1 . The fact that firms losing foreign-licensed technology over time are a 
minority in my sample (accounting for 10% of total sales) gives me confidence that 
my empirical strategy is not affected by differences in pre-trends.
3.2  Results for foreign‑licensed technology
This section presents the results of the effect of joining an international supply chain 
on the probability of using foreign-licensed technology. The average treatment effect 
on treated (ATT) is defined as
which is the difference between the probability of having foreign-licensed technol-
ogy for those firms joining GVCs (first term) and the analogous outcome of the same 
(2)ATT = E(Y1 − Y0|GVC = 1) = E(Y1|GVC = 1) − E(Y0|GVC = 1)
Table 4  Probit results—
predicting GVC participation
Marginal effects of the discrete difference in probability are reported. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The regressions include 
2-digit industry and country-year fixed effects
∗ , ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, 
respectively
Pr(Switch) Pr(Switch) Pr(Switch)
Employment (log) 0.0475*** 0.0488*** 0.0483***
(0.00488) (0.00517) (0.00580)
Foreign (dummy) 0.0251 0.0207 0.0270
(0.0215) (0.0226) (0.0229)
Importer (dummy) 0.0316** 0.0325** 0.0293*
(0.0138) (0.0142) (0.0158)
Exporter (dummy) 0.104*** 0.101*** 0.105***
(0.0229) (0.0234) (0.0254)




Δ Employment 0.00955 0.0155
(0.0121) (0.0167)
Labour productivity (log) 0.0117*
(0.00606)
Observations 2553 2358 1816
Pseudo R2 0.185 0.190 0.216
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firms had they not started participating in GVCs (second term).25 Logically, the lat-
ter outcome cannot be observed, and I rely on a matching technique to construct the 
missing counterfactual (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). The underlying assumption 
for the validity of the matching procedure is that, conditional on a set of observ-
able characteristics, treatment status and potential outcomes are independent. Under 
these assumptions,
These equations imply that
where the second difference in the equation represents the selection bias, which is 
assumed to be zero conditional on X. This approach leaves only the causal effect. 
One potential concern is that the PSM diff-in-diff procedure is not able to control 
for time-variant unobservable factors that simultaneously may affect the decision to 
join a GVC and use a foreign-licensed technology. Therefore, my empirical strat-
egy relies on the assumption that the unobserved differences between treated and 
untreated firms are time-invariant.26
The combination of PSM and a diff-in-diff approach means that my empirical 
strategy looks for divergence in the paths of probability in having foreign-licensed 
technology between the treated firms and the matched control firms that have simi-
lar characteristics in the initial year. The advantage of focusing on firms observed 
before and after becoming two-way traders is that differencing over time allows to 
eliminate the influence of all observable and unobservable time-invariant firms’ 
characteristics (e.g. quality of management). Because my dependent variable is a 
binary outcome, by taking the first difference, I want to compare firms that started 
using licensed technology from one year to another, with firms that never had any 
(3)E[Y1 ∣ X] = E[Y1 ∣ X,GVC = 1] = E[Y1 ∣ X,GVC = 0];
(4)E[Y0 ∣ X] = E[Y0 ∣ X,GVC = 0] = E[Y0 ∣ X,GVC = 1].
(5)
ATT =E[Y1 − Y0 ∣ X,GVC = 1] =
= (E[Y1 ∣ X,GVC = 1] − E[Y0 ∣ X,GVC = 0])
− (E[Y0 ∣ X,GVC = 1] − E[Y0 ∣ X,GVC = 0]) =
=(E[Y1 ∣ X,GVC = 1] − E[Y0 ∣ X,GVC = 0]);
25 The notation reads as follows. Subscripts describe when the outcome is observed: Y1 denotes the out-
come for firms joining GVCs (with treatment), and Y0 is the outcome for firms not joining GVCs (with-
out treatment). In addition, GVC = 1 indicates that the outcome is measured only for those firms joining 
GVCs. Meanwhile, GVC = 0 denotes that the outcome is measured for the control observations.
26 A potential limitation of my empirical strategy is that I do not know whether the participation in 
GVCs happens before the licensing of foreign technology. If this is not the case, my empirical strategy 
would be incorrect since foreign licensing could be causing participation in GVCs and not the other way 
around (as argued in this paper). However, as emphasised by case studies on GVCs, the firm leading the 
supply chain makes relationship-specific investments (such as providing specialised equipment to suppli-
ers or customising products via licensing) to minimise the costs of production and maximise its revenues. 
As a result, the transfer of technology should be concurrent with the firm joining the supply chain. Sec-
tion 3.2 provides further evidence supporting this argument.
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foreign-licensed technology. Hence, I exclude firms possessing foreign technology 
in both years and firms that ‘lost’ such technology from one year to another. As a 
result, both treated and untreated firms do not possess foreign-licensed technology 
in the pre-treatment period.
Table  5 presents the results of the PSM diff-in-diff estimation.27 Firms are 
matched based on the probability of participating in GVCs, conditional on firms’ 
characteristics in the initial period. In particular, in column (1), firms are matched 
within country and industry, and by level of employment, FDI dummy, exporter 
dummy and importer dummy; in column (2), firms are matched within country 
and industry, and by level of employment, FDI dummy, exporter dummy, importer 
dummy, skill intensity, age, labour productivity and employment growth.28 The 
matching is performed over two different sets of variables because some firm-level 
measures present several missing values. Consequently, I regard the estimates in col-
umn (1) as my baseline results.
Table 5 confirms the prediction that becoming a two-way trader has a positive 
impact on the licensing of foreign technology to firms in developing countries. In 
column (1), the ATT is equal to 0.16, indicating that firms, after joining GVCs, have 
a 16% higher probability of using foreign-licensed technology. This effect is statisti-
cally significant at the 1% level. This finding holds when requiring the matching over 
a larger set of firms’ characteristics (in column (2)) and when setting the maximum 
difference in probability between matched pairs of firms (i.e. the caliper) at 10%.29 
This analysis hints at the presence of transfers of foreign technologies along interna-
tional supply chains to developing and emerging economies. The result is consistent 
with firm-level studies finding that GVC participation fosters knowledge transfers 
and productivity improvements in firms in developing countries (Atkin et al. 2017; 
Del Prete et al. 2017; Benkovskis et al. 2020; Alfaro-Urena et al. 2019).
Finally, I look into whether the intensity of engagement in an international supply 
chain may affect the previous results. Case studies on GVCs (Gereffi 1999; Gereffi 
et al. 2005; Pietrobelli and Saliola 2008) suggest that different levels and types of 
buyer involvement with a supplier are crucial for the upgrading of firms in develop-
ing countries. To measure the firm’s engagement with GVCs, I create two dummy 
variables: one for high-intensity GVCs, when the firm exports more than 50% of 
its sales and imports more than 50% of its supplies and materials, and one for low-
intensity GVCs, including the remaining two-way traders. Thus, using a PSM diff-
in-diff approach, I study the impact of joining high- versus low-intensity GVCs on 
27 This procedure is implemented in Stata employing the command teffects psmatch, using the nearest-
neighbour matching with one neighbour. This command implements a matching with replacement, i.e. 
it allows using untreated firms as a match more than once. Similar baseline estimates are obtained by 
using the inverse probability weighting approach (teffects ipw) and radius matching (psmatch2, radius). 
The latter methodology is especially useful for preventing errors in matching treated and untreated firms 
within the same country-industry. However, the command psmatch2 is not used because its standard 
errors are incorrect, not taking into account that the propensity score is estimated.
28 The results are consistent by using TFP à la Wooldridge (2009) as an alternative measure for firm-
level productivity. These results are available upon request.
29 See Table 12 in the “Appendix”. Table 12 also shows that this result remains consistent when requir-
ing at least 3 or 5 matches for each treated firm.
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the licensing of foreign technology. The estimates in Table 6 indicate that the prob-
ability of acquiring foreign-licensed technology is equivalent between firms joining 
high- or low-intensity GVCs. A potential explanation for these results is that the 
licensing of technology is a one-off activity happening simultaneously with the firm 
joining an international supply chain. As shown by case studies on GVCs (see World 
Bank 2020 for a review), the crucial source of lock-in is that GVC participants make 
relationship-specific investments, such as providing specialised equipment and cus-
tomising products via technology licensing. As a result, the operational constraint 
for participating in GVCs is to possess the technology of the buyer leading the sup-
ply chain, independently from the level of involvement with the buyer.
3.3  Complex versus simple traders
To further increase confidence in my results, in this section, I replicate the PSM 
diff-in-diff estimation in two different samples. First, I exclude all non-traders from 
the control group, to compare two-way traders with firms involved in simple interna-
tional activities. Second, I consider non-traders becoming two-way traders as treated 
firms and non-traders becoming either exporters-only or importers-only as control 
firms. These two analyses allow testing for the presence of a ‘pecking order’, i.e. 
whether firms active in multiple modes of internationalisation (two-way traders) 
are more likely to use foreign-licensed technology compared to exporters-only and 
importers-only.
Regarding the first analysis, the PSM procedure looks for a match only within 
the sample of trading firms. The the top panel of Table  7 presents the results of 
this analysis. The ATT in column (1) is equal to 0.121, indicating that firms becom-
ing two-way traders are 12% more likely to use foreign technology than exporters-
only and importers-only. This result implies that while treated firms do not differ 
from exporters-only and importers-only before receiving the treatment, they are sig-
nificantly more likely to use foreign-licensed technology after becoming two-way 
traders. This finding also suggests that the positive relationship between foreign 
Table 5  Results for foreign-
licensed technology
The table presents the average treatment effect on treated (ATT). In 
column (1), firms are matched within country and industry, and by 
level of employment, FDI dummy, exporter dummy and importer 
dummy; in column (2), firms are matched within country and indus-
try, and by level of employment, FDI dummy, exporter dummy, 
importer dummy, skill intensity, age, labour productivity and 
employment growth
∗ , ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, 
respectively
Δ Foreign technology (1) (2)
ATT 0.163∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗
(0.0305) (0.0402)
No. of matched pairs 223 151
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licensing and GVC participation is not driven by the presence of non-traders in the 
control group.
In the second analysis, I compare non-traders becoming two-way traders with 
non-traders becoming either exporters-only or importers-only. The ATT in the bot-
tom panel of Table 7 is positive and significant at the 5% level (in column (3)).30 
This result suggests that non-traders becoming two-way traders are more likely to 
use foreign-licensed technology than non-traders starting to export or import. Thus, 
the evidence supports the idea that accessing international supply chains provides 
more opportunities for the transfer of foreign technologies to developing countries 
than simpler modes of internationalisation.
3.4  Foreign technology and productivity gains
This section complements the previous findings by establishing a link between tech-
nology licensing and firm-level productivity. So far, I have shown that participating 
in GVCs fosters the licensing of foreign technology to firms in developing countries. 
However, it is not clear whether using foreign-licensed technology improves firms’ 
performance.
Some empirical studies find a positive correlation between technology licensing 
and firm-level productivity. Using a survey of Chilean manufacturing plants from 
1990 to 1996, Alvarez et  al. (2002) show that plants using foreign-licensed tech-
nologies are positively associated with higher total factor productivity growth and 
capital accumulation. In addition, Yasar and Paul (2007), using a sample of Turkish 
manufacturing plants, find that licensing foreign technology is positively related to 
higher productivity levels. To move beyond these evidence based on correlations, I 
Table 6  Results for high- versus low-intensity GVCs
The table presents the average treatment effect on treated (ATT). In columns (1) and (3), firms are 
matched within country and industry, and by level of employment, FDI dummy, exporter dummy and 
importer dummy; in columns (2) and (4), firms are matched within country and industry, and by level 
of employment, FDI dummy, exporter dummy, importer dummy, skill intensity, age, labour productivity 
and employment growth. Due to limited observations available for high-intensity GVCs, the following 
countries are excluded from the analysis: Senegal, Uganda and Zambia; as well as the following indus-
tries: 26 and 27
∗ , ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively
(1) (2) (3) (4)





No. of matched pairs 58 48 194 137
30 The ATT in column (4) loses significance, but this may be due to the smaller sample of firms.
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use a PSM diff-in-diff approach to test whether acquiring a foreign-licensed tech-
nology leads to productivity gains. This procedure directly compares the productiv-
ity of firms with and without a foreign-licensed technology with otherwise similar 
characteristics, allowing me to disentangle the causal effect of foreign licensing on 
firm-level productivity. In particular, firms are matched within country and industry, 
and by level of employment, FDI dummy, exporter dummy, importer dummy, skill 
intensity, age, employment growth and initial productivity levels. Finally, by taking 
the first difference of the dependent variable allows controlling for time-invariant 
firms’ observable and unobservable characteristics.31
Table  8 shows the results for productivity. Column (1) presents the results for 
TFP, calculated following Wooldridge (2009)’s methodology, and column (2) dis-
plays the results for labour productivity, calculated as value added per worker. The 
estimates are large and significant at the 1% level. The ATT for TFP equals 0.88, 
indicating that firms acquiring foreign-licensed technology experience a rise of 88% 
of their TFP. This finding holds by requiring at least 3 or 5 matches for each treated 
firm and by setting the caliper at 10%.32 Finally, column (2) illustrates that the ATT 
is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, though smaller at 0.50.
These large effects may be due to the presence of an initial productivity boost 
from the acquisition of foreign technology and subsequently to learning by 
Table 7  Results for complex versus simple traders
The table presents the average treatment effect on treated (ATT). In columns (1) and (3), firms are 
matched within country and industry, and by level of employment and FDI dummy; in columns (2) and 
(4), firms are matched within country and industry, and by level of employment, FDI dummy, skill inten-
sity, age, labour productivity and employment growth. Due to limited observations available, the follow-
ing countries are excluded from the estimation in columns (3) and (4): Chile, Ethiopia, Myanmar, Peru, 
Uruguay and Zambia
∗ , ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively
Δ Foreign technology (1) (2) (3) (4)
Only traders in the control group
 ATT 0.121** 0.109***
(0.0492) (0.0376)
Only non-traders at time t − 1
 ATT 0.186** 0.128
(0.0765) (0.0839)
 No. of matched pairs 223 151 70 39
31 The main limitation of this empirical strategy is that I do not know when the firm acquires the for-
eign-licensed technology. With an average time span over the two periods of 4 years, firms could acquire 
a foreign-licensed technology after a period of sustained productivity growth due to factors unrelated to 
GVC participation. In these cases, productivity improvement would be the factor driving the acquisition 
of foreign-licensed technology rather than the opposite, as this paper argues. However, a recent study by 
Alfaro-Urena et al. (2019) finds, for firms in Costa Rica, no evidence of selection in supplying to multi-
national enterprises, strengthening the validity of my identification strategy.
32 These results are presented in Table 13 in the “Appendix”.
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participating in GVCs. Benkovskis et al. (2020) and Alfaro-Urena et al. (2019) doc-
ument the presence of strong and persistent productivity gains after firms join an 
international supply chain. My results are also in line with Del Prete et al. (2017), 
establishing a causal link between GVC participation and firm-level productivity for 
a sample of North African manufacturing firms. Finally, this finding, combined with 
my previous results, suggests that interactions with foreign firms through GVC par-
ticipation may foster the transfer of technology and knowledge to suppliers in devel-
oping countries, consistent with Atkin et al. (2017).
4  Conclusions
The literature has highlighted the importance of international trade as a channel for 
the international transfer of technology. Empirical studies show that trading across 
borders may bring several advantages to firms in developing countries, particularly 
for those exporting to advanced economies. As a result, many developing countries 
are striving to participate in GVCs in the hope of stimulating economic growth 
through knowledge transfer. However, a consensus is lacking on the role of GVCs in 
affecting developing and emerging economies (UNCTAD 2013; Backer et al. 2014; 
Taglioni and Winkler 2016, World Bank 2020). A prevalent worry is that manu-
facturing firms in developing countries are remaining stuck in labour-intensive low-
value-added activities, such as product assembly or processing trade.
This study aims to shed light on this issue by examining the causal relation-
ship between GVC participation and firms’ performance in developing countries. 
I identify causality, controlling for the possible endogeneity of GVC participation 
by using a difference-in-difference approach in combination with a propensity score 
matching technique. My analysis extends the literature in three ways. First, I look 
at a previously unexplored channel of technology transfer, namely, foreign licens-
ing. As shown by Rigo (2017), foreign licensing is potentially a critical channel for 
the transfer of international technologies, comparable to FDI. Second, I investigate 
whether the complexity of the mode of internationalisation may affect the transfer of 
technology to firms in developing countries. The literature has shown that the trans-
fer of technology may depend on several factors, but based on the author’s knowl-
edge, this is the first paper that distinguishes between simple and complex traders. 
Finally, I study whether acquiring a foreign-licensed technology leads to productiv-
ity gains.
These are my main findings. First, I identify a positive impact of becoming a two-
way trader on the licensing of foreign technology. Worth noting, I find that technol-
ogy licensing involves a ‘pecking order’, with two-way traders more likely to acquire 
a foreign license than exporters-only and importers-only. This evidence suggests that 
the complexity associated with the modes of internalisation determines foreign tech-
nology licensing. Second, the results for productivity show that acquiring foreign-
licensed technology leads to large productivity improvements at the firm level. The 
combination of these results suggests that the transfer of foreign technology along 
international supply chains might explain these productivity gains. Based on these 
findings, governments might consider implementing policies that facilitate firms’ 
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participation in GVCs. Policies designed to support entry in GVCs may represent 
a vital tool for enhancing firms’ learning possibilities through the introduction of 
new foreign technologies. My findings strengthen the view that GVC participation 
may be crucial for the success of a country, fostering industrialisation and economic 
development.
Future research should look for detailed information on buyer-supplier relation-
ships to precisely identify different types of GVC participation and their impact on 
the transfer of technology. The form and organisation of a supply chain are essen-
tial dimensions that should be considered when studying the implications of GVC 
participation for suppliers in developing and emerging economies. As shown by 
case studies on GVCs, the intensity of the buyer’s involvement with local suppliers 
may foster further the transfer of technology and know-how to firms in developing 
countries.
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Appendix: Additional tables
See Tables 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13.
Table 8  Results for productivity
The table presents the average treatment effect on treated (ATT). In 
columns (1) and (2), firms are matched within country and industry, 
and by level of employment, FDI dummy, exporter dummy, importer 
dummy, skill intensity, age, employment growth and initial produc-
tivity levels
∗ , ∗∗ , ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, 
respectively
(1) (2)
Δ TFP Δ VA/Empl
ATT 0.883*** 0.502***
(0.228) (0.175)
No. of matched pairs 130 214
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Table 9  Number of firms by country and year
My sample is composed of harmonised two-year panel datasets from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. 
The countries selected must satisfy two criteria: (i) I include only surveys administered after the year 
2006, since they were based on a randomised stratified sample; (ii) I include all surveys with enough 
observations to perform my empirical analysis. For Nigeria, firms were initially surveyed either in year 
2007 or 2009, while the follow-up survey was done for both groups of firms in year 2014
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2013 2014 2015 2016
Argentina 306 0 0 0 306 0 0 0 0 0
Bangladesh 0 207 0 0 0 207 0 0 0 0
Chile 277 0 0 0 277 0 0 0 0 0
Colombia 188 0 0 0 188 0 0 0 0 0
Ethiopia 0 0 0 0 0 117 0 0 117 0
Indonesia 0 0 0 378 0 0 0 0 378 0
Mexico 143 0 0 0 143 0 0 0 0 0
Myanmar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 149 0 149
Nigeria 0 107 0 106 0 0 0 213 0 0
Peru 189 0 0 0 189 0 0 0 0 0
Philippines 0 0 0 256 0 0 0 0 256 0
Senegal 0 118 0 0 0 0 0 118 0 0
Uganda 119 0 0 0 0 0 119 0 0 0
Ukraine 0 0 98 0 0 0 98 0 0 0
Uruguay 145 0 0 0 145 0 0 0 0 0
Vietnam 0 0 0 192 0 0 0 0 192 0
Zambia 0 88 0 0 0 0 88 0 0 0
Zimbabwe 0 0 0 0 0 156 0 0 0 156
Total 1367 520 98 932 1248 480 305 480 943 305
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Table 10  Number and share of treated firms by country
These statistics are based on the sample of firms included in the empirical analysis. Thus, firms los-
ing the treatment from one year to another, always treated firms and those firms without information 
to calculate the variables needed for the analysis are excluded. Columns (1) and (2) present the number 
and proportion of firms becoming two-way traders from the first year to the second. Columns (3) and 
(4) show the number and proportion of firms acquiring foreign-licensed technology from the first to the 
second year
Country No. of switchers Share of switch-
ers (%)
No. of new foreign 
licenses
Share of new 
foreign licenses 
(%)
Argentina 25 14 28 11
Bangladesh 32 29 32 17
Chile 25 12 22 9
Colombia 16 10 7 4
Ethiopia 11 10 4 5
Indonesia 8 2 51 17
Mexico 20 16 16 13
Myanmar 5 4 5 4
Nigeria 41 20 23 13
Peru 16 13 17 10
Philippines 20 11 25 13
Senegal 3 3 12 11
Uganda 6 5 18 17
Ukraine 6 7 8 11
Uruguay 6 5 9 7
Vietnam 16 11 22 13
Zambia 2 3 9 14
Zimbabwe 26 19 32 23
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Table 11  Number and share of treated firms by industry
These statistics are based on the sample of firms included in the empirical analysis. Thus, firms losing 
the treatment from one year to another one, always treated firms and those firms without information 
to calculate the variables needed for the analysis are excluded. Columns (1) and (2) present the number 
and proportion of firms becoming two-way traders from the first year to the second. Columns (3) and 
(4) show the number and proportion of firms acquiring foreign-licensed technology from the first to the 
second year
ISIC rev. 3.1 No. of switchers Share of switch-
ers (%)
No. of new foreign 
licenses
Share of new 
foreign licenses 
(%)
15 42 6 76 11
17 32 14 32 13
18 61 14 69 12
19 10 17 8 11
20 0 0 5 7
22 0 0 11 20
24 35 14 37 14
25 21 15 13 10
26 16 9 16 9
27 6 14 0 0
28 18 10 23 12
29 14 13 18 14
31 0 0 8 15
36 11 11 13 14
Table 12  Results for foreign-
licensed technology—
robustness checks
The table presents the average treatment effect on treated (ATT). In 
column (1), firms are matched within country and industry, and by 
level of employment, FDI dummy, exporter dummy and importer 
dummy; in column (2), firms are matched within country and indus-
try, and by level of employment, FDI dummy, exporter dummy, 
importer dummy, skill intensity, age, labour productivity and 
employment growth




At least 3 matches
ATT 0.118∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(0.0280) (0.0231)
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